On Slippery Slope Arguments

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On slippery slope arguments: or why slippery slope arguments are not as bad as we think they are.

Recently there has been much demonization of slippery slope arguments, with even the mentioning of something being a slippery slope argument leads to the vast majority of people instantly rejecting it as a valid point. This is very suspect to me, as I fail to see why such arguments are inherently bad. Note that I am not saying ALL slippery slope arguments are good, but I want to refute the point that ALL slippery slope arguments must be bad by virtue of their nature.

In the public arena, we must always realise that all types of arguments, and in this case slippery slope arguments, have 2 dimensions to them, the empirical (or in other words the actual reality of the physical circumstance), and the philosophical (or the ‘principle’ of things). To address the first point, when we talk of empirical fact, we must look to historical precedent. Do societies/countries who adopt abc, as a matter of empirical fact lead to xyz? This is a question that people can really only determine by looking at how as a matter of fact societies that adopted abc have resulted in, rather much like the field of science, where any theory and assertion should be accompanied by empirical experimental data, or at least have the hope of being accompanied by such data. In such a case, there really isn’t any reason to discount the empirical data of societies that have gone before us, as they constitute the body of evidence to indicate how abc policy shapes the reality of a society. And indeed, no other body of data outside of empirical data can actually be counted as ‘evidence’! For example, Einstein’s theories of general relativity, no matter how mathematically beautiful, nor supported by how many prominent scientists, would always have remained as an unnecessary complication, unless it could (and it did!) make predictions that were directly observable that contradicted Newton. As such, societies that have gone before us in adopting abc constitute our ‘experimental data’, which yes we can try accounting for different variables and parameters (like different culture ect), but ultimately our theories that try accounting for these differing parameters must always be seen to be unable to triumph hard experimental data. All they can really do is to give plausible explanation why we might not see xyz effects. I am also not saying that abc must definitely result in xyz if all the other societies do so, but instead I am trying to indicate the point that slippery slope arguments usually point back to empirical data which you cannot merely discount.

Now to look at the second dimension of the slippery slope argument, or the philosophical. This mainly poses the question of whether if we allow abc, is there any principled reason or justification to not adopt xyz in the future? And while some may think that this is pushing things to extremes to make trouble (we aren’t even talking about xyz, why bring it up?!), all societies do indeed hold to some (some may call them arbitrary) principles that indicate where something will definitely have to ‘stop’. For example, in many democratic societies, we call it a constitution. We can adopt abc, def,ect, as long as it DOES NOT contradict this set of statements of our society in the constitution. And indeed, enacting abc will set precedent in the society (which is doubly important in a society mostly run by common law as opposed to code law). If you want to enact abc and shut up people who say this will imply that there is nothing stopping you from enacting xyz, you must build up a coherent philosophical stance and show that this philosophical stance 1) does not contradict itself and 2) still allows you to enact abc while ‘stopping’ xyz. If not, you must realise that in principle there is no difference between abc and xyz to the people arguing against enacting abc, and you have to be willing to ‘fight on all counts’ from abc to xyz. Indeed, even if you say you hold on to no sacred cows, isn’t that a type of principle as well? Unless you can show that it is possible to have a ‘middle ground’ philosophical stance, you cant really expect people to give up their philosophical stance for yours easily, because to do so is in essence ‘being incoherent’. And as such, you cannot also discount slippery slope arguments on the philosophical/principle front, as they point to a failure of you to come up with a principled alternative, a failure to communicate that alternative properly, or a fundamental philosophical difference between you two.